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ABSTRACT
When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-
dimensional spatial voting model, the ‘worst-case’ scenario is a social choice
conﬁguration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority
rate as high as 1 1=ðnþ1Þ is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower
d-dimensional (d <n) linear map spans the possible candidates’ platforms.
These d ‘ideological’ dimensions imply some linkages between the n political
issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely
exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n
grows to inﬁnity. Moreover, the equilibrium is the mean voter.
KEY WORDS . ideology • mean voter theorem • spatial voting • super
majority
1. Introduction
It has been well known since Plott (1967) that a 50%-majority stable political
equilibrium typically does not exist in a multidimensional voting setup. A way
to restore the existence of a stable outcome is to require a super-majority rule to
overrun the status quo, thus giving rise to the concept of ρ-majority equilibrium,
where ρ∈ ½1=2; 1 is the proportion of the voting population a challenger must
rally to take over. It is widely admitted that the smaller the rate of super majority
needed to secure existence of an equilibrium (i.e. the less conservative the vot-
ing rule), the better.
There is a wide variety of literature on the level of super majority required for
existence, both in deterministic or probabilistic setups (see, e.g. Ferejohn and
Grether, 1974; Caplin and Nalebuff, 1988, 1991; Balasko and Cre`s, 1997). In a
standard social choice setup where voters, endowed with continuous and convex
preferences, have to choose among political alternatives in a non-empty, compact
and convex subset of Rn, Greenberg (1979) shows that a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of a ρ-majority equilibrium is ρ≥ n=ðn+ 1).
To show that this bound is tight, Greenberg (1979) constructs a voting config-
uration where no incumbent is stable with respect to a super-majority rule with
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rate smaller than n=ðn+ 1). The configuration is as follows. Take n+ 1 indepen-
dent points in Rn and interpret them as the ideal political choices of n+ 1 voters
endowed with Euclidean preferences. Denote by Sn the n-dimensional simplex
generated by the voters’ ideal points. Fix an incumbent x∈ Sn; then
sðxÞ= argminfk x  s k , s∈ Sng is unanimously preferred to x, hence x is not
stable under any ρ-majority rule with ρ< 1. Now, fix an incumbent x∈ Sn; then
it is always possible to find a challenger preferred by n out of the n+ 1 voters:
indeed, denote by Sn the (n  1)-dimensional simplex generated by the ideal
points of these n voters (Sn is a face of Sn), then one can reconduct the previous
argument, and show that sðxÞ= argminfk x  s k, s∈ Sng is preferred to x by all
of these n voters.
This example is a ‘worst-case’ scenario. One easily sees that if the voters’
ideal points are taken in a lower-dimensional subspace, then the upper bound
decreases, but the gain remains small though and one gets the existence of poli-
tical equilibria for not too conservative voting rules only when the number, n, of
political issues is very low. This bound is: ρ= 1=2 when n= 1 (the so-called
‘median voter theorem’); ρ= 2=3 when n= 2; and for n≥ 3, then the required
rate of super majority must be above 3/4 (and converges to the unanimity criter-
ion when n goes to infinity), a level very rarely observed in practice. Indeed,
constitutions or corporate charters build on super-majority rates which are very
rarely above 70%,1 although the number of political issues at stake in electoral
processes is obviously often very large: it is not rare, when reading political
platforms proposed by candidates in large elections, to denumerate several doz-
ens of issues. Hence the question: why, if there are so many issues, do we
observe such reasonable super-majority rates in practice?
A first answer might be that one should not believe in Greenberg’s worst-
case scenario. A second answer can be found in the Hinich–Ordeshook spatial
voting model.2 According to the latter, there are only a few political dimensions
underlying the platforms proposed by the candidates. These few dimensions are
claimed to be ideological. Ideologies imply linkages3 between political issues
and thus span a lower-dimensional linear space (dubbed the ‘campaign space’ in
1. For decisions on issues which are delegated to the European Union, the rate was 72% in the
Maastricht Treaty; it was decreased to a mix of 65% of the States and 55% of the population in the
Constitutional Treaty.
2. This model was first proposed by Cahoon et al. (1976), Ordeshook (1976) and Hinich and Pol-
lard (1981) and then developed by Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Hinich and Munger (1997). See
also Poole (2005) for an exhaustive survey of this approach.
3. These linkages formalize the fundamental insight of Converse (1964) according to which ideol-
ogy (the Conversian ‘belief system’) interrelates and bundles the political issues: ideology is funda-
mentally the knowledge of what goes with what. As Converse (1964: 207) states it: ideology is
‘a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of
constraint’.
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the following) on which the original distribution of voters’ ideal points is
projected.
The assumption that political platforms are based on ideology stems from the
belief that the cleavages between candidates separate along fewer, simpler lines
than the n-dimensional policy space would imply. As Popkin (1994: 51) states
it: ‘Ideology is not the mark of sophistication and education, but of uncertainty
and lack of ability to connect policies with benefits. . . Parties use ideologies to
highlight critical differences between themselves, and to remind voters of their
past successes’. This approach has some empirical relevance: Poole and
Rosenthal (1991, 1996) show that in the USA, with the exception of the 32nd
Congress, two dimensions are always capable of explaining more than 80% and
up to 95% of the variation in the votes of elected officials on most issues. In the
same vein, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and McCarty et al. (1997) test the
Hinich–Ordeshook spatial voting model on post-World War II Congressional
roll-call voting and show that only two dimensions are required to account for
most of the votes: the liberal–conservative continuum4 and the dimension of
conflict over race and civil rights. Equivalently, an analysis of French data
yields, according to Rosenthal and Voeten (2004), that ‘a stable two-dimen-
sional spatial configuration explains deputies’ vote choices in the Fourth Repub-
lic extraordinarily well’.
Another type of political debate often builds on more than two underlying
dimensions: proxy fights in publicly traded corporations in the context of market
failures.5 The stakes are probably simpler to grasp than in ordinary political
debates; moreover, shareholders usually have access to more measurable and
precise information which is easier to aggregate. Yet corporate charters rarely
choose rates of super majority beyond 65%.
The answer to the question ‘why do we observe such a reasonable super-
majority rate in practice?’ seems to be: not only because the political competi-
tion articulates along fewer and simpler lines than the n-dimensional policy
space would imply, but also one should not believe in Greenberg’s worst-case
scenario. The present paper goes one step further. Its main contribution is an
aggregation theorem that links the two latter arguments: one should not believe
in Greenberg’s worst-case scenario because the political competition happens
in a lower-dimensional subspace spanned by the underlying ideologies. Indeed,
if we randomize on the linkages between issues imputed by ideologies, our main
result (Theorem 1) states that the Hinich–Ordeshook approach almost surely
4. A judgemental dimension that has been ‘highly serviceable for simplifying and organizing
events in most Western politics for the past century’ (Converse, 1964: 214).
5. The heterogeneity of the shareholders’ opinions can come from imperfect competition, the
incompleteness of financial market structure or the presence of externalities. ‘Ideological’ dimen-
sions in corporate politics can be the ‘philosophy’ with respect to debt versus equity, horizontal ver-
sus vertical integration, international diversification, expansion versus concentration, etc.
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transforms Greenberg’s worst-case scenario into the best-case scenario of a
symmetric distribution of voting characteristics. As a consequence, we obtain
(Theorem 2) a mean-voter theorem: the mean voter happens to almost always
be the unique 50%-majority equilibrium, when the number of political issues
grows large.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the definition of a
political equilibrium in the classical Downsian spatial voting model; then Sec-
tion 3 presents its Hinich–Ordeshook sophistication. Section 4 states and proves
the aggregation theorems. Section 5 ends the paper with some concluding
comments.
2. Voters, Platforms and the Majority Rule
The setup to model the electoral process and voting mechanism is the classical
Downsian multidimensional spatial voting model (Downs, 1957). There are n
measurable criteria of political activity, so that a political platform in the policy
space can be represented as an n-dimensional vector: x∈Rn. There are m voters
in a set I. Each voter is endowed with an Euclidean preference relation on Rn:
agent i, 1≤ i≤m, has a preferred choice in the policy space, xi ∈Rn, and his/her
utility function over the space of political choices is decreasing with the Eucli-
dean distance from his/her preferred choice:
8x∈Rn uiðxÞ= k xi  x k :
A society is an m-tuple X= ðxiÞmi= 1.
We measure the stability of a political platform in a given society through
the Simpson–Kramer approach. Given two political choices (a, bÞ∈Rn×Rn,
ρðb, a) measures the ratio of the electorate that strictly prefers b to a:
ρðb, aÞ= #fi∈ I |uiðbÞ > uiðaÞg
m
:
The score of a political choice a∈Rn is ρðaÞ= maxb∈Rn ρðb, a). Clearly,
the score of any political choice taken outside the closed convex hull, hXi, of
X will be 1: the challenger b that minimizes the distance between a and hXi is
unanimously preferred to a. Hence, looking for the ‘best’ status quo, i.e. the
ones with lowest score, we can reduce our search to hXi. The min–max rate of
society X is ρ * = mina∈Rn ρða). The min–max set of society X is
S * ðXÞ= fa∈Rn|ρðaÞ= ρ * g.
The majority rule with rate ρ∈ ½0; 1 states that candidate b is preferred by
society X to (or defeats) candidate a if and only if ρðb, aÞ > ρ. A candidate a is
said to be ρ-majority stable in society X if and only if there is no alternative that
defeats it, i.e. if and only if its score is not larger than ρ: ρðaÞ≤ ρ. Such a candi-
date is a political equilibrium for the majority rule with rate ρ.
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Since the seminal work of Plott (1967)6 we know that 50%-majority stable
equilibria generally do not exist when n≥ 2. To recover the existence of politi-
cal equilibria, one has to impose a super-majority voting rule, i.e. a voting rule
with rate ρ > 1=2. This paper deals with the existence of such political equili-
brium based on super-majority voting. Along that search, political platforms in
the min–max set have this appealing property that they are equilibria for the
lowest rate of super majority, hence the less conservative voting rule.
The super-majority rate one has to impose in order to recover existence of
equilibrium can be quite high: as extensively explained in the introduction, sup-
pose that m= n+ 1 and the m-tuple X are the vertices of an n-dimensional sim-
plex, then obviously any political choice in hXi has a score of n=ðn+ 1) (it is
enough to choose a challenger closer to any of the n+ 1ðn  1)-dimensional
faces of the simplex). Therefore, since any political choice outside hXi has score
1, the min–max rate is n=ðn+ 1) and the min–max set is hXi: one has to impose
a super-majority rule of rate ρ≥ n=ðn+ 1) to get a stable political choice, and
then all choices in hXi are ρ-majority stable. Greenberg (1979) proves that the
condition ρ≥ n=ðn+ 1), to get the existence of a ρ-majority stable political
equilibrium, is in fact sufficient as soon as the voter’s preferences satisfy very
mild properties of continuity and convexity. Hence, the latter case is a worst-
case scenario, as far as getting not too conservative a min–max rate is con-
cerned. The present paper can be read as an attempt at an argument against the
relevance of this worst-case scenario.
Some convincing arguments along the same line are available in the social
choice literature. One of the most important is given by Caplin and Nalebuff
(1988, 1991). They give a dimension-free upper bound to the min–max
rate under the conditions that preferred choices of agents are selected from a
σ-concave distribution with compact and convex support. This upper bound
(which, asymptotically, is lower than 64%) is given by the score of the mean
voter, the voter whose preferred choice is the barycenter of all xi. This literature
can roughly be regarded as looking for multidimensional versions of the median
voter theorem.
3. Ideology, Candidates and Political Campaigns
A central assumption of our model is that, although the number (n, here) of cri-
teria for political activity can indeed be quite large, the political competition
takes place in a subspace of lower dimension: d< n. In accordance with the
Hinich–Ordeshook spatial voting model, this lower-dimensional space is consid-
ered to be the ideological space, assumed to be Rd without loss of generality.
6. More recent literature on the existence of the core in social choice problems is also related. See
Banks (1995), McKelvey and Schofield (1986), Meirowitz (2004) and Saari (1997).
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According to this approach, the ideologies are linked to the platforms by a linear
map, L, from the ideological space to the policy space: a candidate, πA ∈Rd,
imputes a platform xA ∈Rn such that xA= x0+ LπA, where x0 is the platform of
status quo policies. Finally, the d-dimensional affine subspace which is the
image of Rd by L translated by x0 is called the campaign space, C⊂Rn, in the
following. Before developing the strength of the model, let us illustrate through
an example how the linear map L operates.
3.1 An Illustration
Issues of political activity are often precise and technical; consider two such
classical issues such as (1) how much of the State’s budget, x1, must be allo-
cated to buy helicopters, and (2) how much of the State’s budget, x2, must be
allocated to create more slots in kindergartens. For the sake of simplicity, we
limit the issues to these two, hence n= 2. The assumption is made that platforms
proposed by candidates in this two-dimensional policy space can be explained
through a (say) one-dimensional underlying linear subspace, e.g. the classical
liberal–conservative (left–right) dimension; hence d= 1. Given a vector of sta-
tus quo policies x0, the sensitivity of xj, j= 1; 2, to the position π of the candi-
date in the ideological space is a fixed scalar lj ∈R, therefore xj is an affine
function of π:
xj= x0j + ljπ, j= 1; 2:
Figure 1 (Figure 2) plots the relation between ideology and helicopters
(kindergartens, respectively). For example, the policy regarding kindergartens is
almost not sensitive to ideology, and only slightly decreases (l2 is small and
negative) with π: a leftist candidate wants to create slots in kindergartens
because these structures are more used by low-class workers than by wealthy
families; a rightist candidate uses slots’ creation in kindergartens as an incentive
to increase fertility. The policy regarding helicopters is more sensitive to ideol-
ogy, and increasing (l1 is positive): rightist candidates are usually more hawkish,
and spending on helicopters rises as ideology moves right, as shown by the plain
line L1.
The sensitivity of policies to ideology as depicted in Figures 1 and 2 implies
a linkage between the two issues in the policy space: the induced campaign
space, C (plain line on Figure 3), is going through the status quo x0 with slope
l2=l1. The induced ‘ideal candidate’ xi of voter i, whose preferred platform is xi,
in obtained by orthogonal projection of xi on the campaign space. Consequently,
voter i votes for the candidate whose imputed platform is closest to his ‘ideal
candidate’ xi. In the general (n, d) case, the Euclidean structure of the original
voting configuration gives rise, through the orthogonal projection on C, to a
social choice problem involving m voters with Euclidean preferences in Rd.
Hence, we are dealing with a d-dimensional spatial voting problem with m
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voters and thus we are left with a combinatorial problem about m-tuples of
points in Rd rather than in Rn.
If the Hinich–Ordeshook spatial voting model has the virtue of offering a
more realistic view of electoral competition, we argue in the present paper that
it moreover has extremely nice properties as far as aggregation of individual
preferences is concerned. Indeed, we prove in the following that the worst-case
configuration of the society (worst case as far as aggregation is concerned), i.e.
when the point set X is an (n+ 1)-tuple of points forming a n-dimensional sim-
plex with equal voting rights on the vertices, transforms almost surely into a
best-case configuration, i.e. the (n+ 1)-tuples of projected points in RdX is sym-
metrically distributed.
The first step of our argument is to qualify what we mean by ‘almost surely’.
Let us go back to the above illustration. Suppose now that an exogenous histori-
cal shock occurs, e.g. a terrorist attack. Most probably this event is going to have
Figure 1. The relation between ideology and helicopters.
Figure 2. The relation between ideology and kindergartens.
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an impact on the sensitivity of the first issue (helicopters) to ideology: all candi-
dates become hawkish and want to invest more into such a modern defense tool
as helicopters, independently of his/her ideology. Hence, there is a new line L
0
1,
with a much smaller sensitivity rate: l
0
1< l1 (see the, almost flat, dotted line in
Figure 1). It is probably going to be the case that everybody in the society, can-
didates and voters, are going to prefer an absolute increase Dx1 > 0 in the politi-
cal platform; we assume that in such an event the perturbed status quo becomes
x
0
0
1 = x01+Dx1, and that for all i, the preferred platform’s first component
becomes x
0
i1= xi1+Dx1. Hence, this general absolute increase Dx1 results in a
global (rightward) translation of the spatial point-set configuration, and this
translation has no impact on the geometric properties of our problem. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we can consider Dx1 to be zero, and the only impact
of this exogenous historical event is a drop in the sensitivity rate l1. This results
into a new campaign space C
0
(dotted in Figure 3) going through the status quo
x0 with slope l2=l
0
1. The new induced ‘ideal candidate’ x
0
i of voter i is obtained
by orthogonal projection of xi onto the new campaign space C
0
.
The idea is that such random shocks always happen, although fortunately
they are not all as dramatic as a terrorist attack, and that their ‘media’ treatment
Figure 3. The induced campaign space.
438 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 22(4)
and destiny can change the sensitivities of various issues to ideology. Then the
central question is: how is this d-dimensional campaign space chosen? In the
present paper, we take a purely Laplacian perspective and assume that C is
selected at random, according to a ‘uniform’ distribution on the natural underly-
ing space. We define C as an element in the Grassmanian Gðn, d) of oriented d-
subspaces in Rn. Random historical and mediatic shocks generate a probability
distribution over Gðn, d). Among the latter, one arises ‘naturally’: the unique
rotation-invariant probability measure, μðn, d) (known as the Haar probability
measure), on Gðn, d), which intuitively selects all d-dimensional campaign
spaces ‘with equal probability’. Hence, μðn, d) will be dubbed impartial in the
following. The idea behind impartiality is that the main themes at stake in a
political campaign depend heavily on the exogenous shocks of recent history,
and the exogenous treatment by the media of these shocks.
Finally, we define our political competition as a non-cooperative game as fol-
lows. Consider a three-stage game in which there are m voters, an incumbent,
and a challenger. Voters’ Euclidean preference profiles are formed by ideologi-
cal positions in a subset P⊆Rnm and are common knowledge. In the first stage
the incumbent chooses an ideological position in the n-dimensional policy
space. After observing this, the challenger chooses an ideological position in the
policy space. Then, an impartial shock determines the d< n-dimensional cam-
paign space. Each candidate’s campaign position is determined as the orthogo-
nal projection of their ideological positions to the campaign space. After
observing these, the m voters vote to maximize their utility for a candidate
according to the two political platforms imputed on the campaign space. The
incumbent is beaten by the challenger if and only if the latter gets more than
50% of the votes. Each candidate tries to maximize his/her chances of winning
when choosing his ideological position in stage 1 or 2, respectively. A 50% poli-
tical equilibrium for given m is the ideological position chosen by the incumbent
that is sustained by a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game for any config-
uration of voter preference profiles in P.
4. Main Result
For any selected campaign space C, the original social choice problem charac-
terized by the point set X in Rn gives rise to a lower-dimensional social choice
problem characterized by the (orthogonally projected) point set X in Rd. Sup-
pose that X is a m  1-dimensional simplex in Rn, such that for each i, xi (a col-
umn vector in Rn) is the ith vertex of simplex X. We say that X is regular if
xi  xj
 = xi  xkk k for any i, j; k. The simplex is O-centered if Pi xi ¼ 0.
Note that for an O-centered regular simplex, we have xTi xj= xTi xk < 0 for any
i, j; k. In this section, we mute the translational part of the political shock as
explained in the previous section and focus on the rotational shock to the
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campaign space. First, we consider rotations pivoted at the center of gravity of
the simplex X, that is, when the mean voter is the status quo (i.e. it is always on
the campaign space). Center of gravity is normalized to O, the center of the
coordinate system. As we will show, this has no cost in our approach, since the
center of gravity is the unique 50% political equilibrium (Theorem 2).
THEOREM 1. Let the campaign space C be impartially randomly selected. The
point set X coincides in distribution with a negatively correlated sample from a
symmetric probability distribution in Rd which becomes asymptotically inde-
pendent as n→∞ with the rate 1=n when X is a regular O-centered simplex.
Proof. Let n≥m > d. Take a regular m 1ð )-dimensional O-centered simplex
in Rn whose vertices are column vectors of an n×m matrix7
X= x1 x2    xm½ . We have xTi xj < 0 for any i and j. Let P be d× n with
πii= 1 for i∈ 1; 2; . . . , nf g and all other entries of P are 0. We can denote the
random d-subspace by C=PR where R is a random rotation matrix distributed
with the Haar probability measure among the n× n rotation matrix group
denoted by Rðn), that is, every n× n rotation matrix is chosen with equal prob-
ability as a draw of R. Note that C is distributed with probability measure
μ n, dð ) in Grassmanian G n, dð ). Note that every rotation matrix is an orthogonal
matrix. Let O nð ) denote the n× n orthogonal matrix group. First, we consider
orthogonal matrices instead of rotation matrices. Let C * =PA be such that A
is a random orthogonal matrix distributed with the Haar probability measure in
O nð Þ; that is, every n× n orthogonal matrix is chosen with the same probability
as a draw of A. Note that orthogonal transformations include rotoinversions
(where det Að Þ=  1) and rotations det Að Þ= 1ð ), we will rule out rotoinver-
sions later. First note that every column of A has a symmetric distribution and
EA= 0, since if A is orthogonal then A is orthogonal and both A=A and
A=  A are equally likely events. Since orthogonal transformation preserves
the inner-product of two vectors, we have
P
i aijaik ¼ 0 for j 6¼k and
P
i a
2
ij ¼ 1
for any orthogonal matrix A. Since every row permutation and column permuta-
tion of A is equally likely to occur, Eða2ij) and E aijak‘

) is constant for every
i, j; k and ‘. First,
P
i Eða2ijÞ ¼ 1) implies Eða2ijÞ= 1n. Moreover,P
i E aijaik
  ¼ 0 implies E aijaik
 = 0, implying with the symmetry argument
that E aijak‘
 = 0 for every i, j; k; ‘ such that i 6¼k or j 6¼‘. We are interested in
the distribution of the columns of P=C *X=PAX; the projection of X to the
random subspace C * . We will show that each column vector has identical sym-
metric distribution and each pair of column vectors are negatively correlated.
7. Let the (i, j)th entry of a matrix H be denoted by hij and jth column vector of H be denoted by
hj.
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The two events P=PAX and P=P Að ÞX are equally likely to occur, there-
fore each column of P has a symmetric distribution. Since each xi has the same
length, each column vector Axi is an identical random vector. Let
Sij= cov Axi,Axj

) for i 6¼j. The g, hð )th entry of Sij is
σ
ij
gh ¼ E
P
k agkxki
  P
‘ ah‘x‘j
  
. For g 6¼h,
σ
ij
gh ¼
X
k
X
‘
E agkah‘
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼0
xkix‘j ¼ 0:
For g= h,
σ
ij
hh ¼
X
k
X
‘
E ahkah‘ð Þxkix‘j ¼
X
k
E a2hk
 
|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
¼1n
xkixkj þ
X
k
X
‘ 6¼k
E ahkah‘ð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼0
xkix‘j
¼ 1
n
xTi xj< 0:
Since pi is the first d coordinates of Axi for each i, different coordinates of
each pair of pi and pj are independently sampled and the same coordinates of
each pair pi and pj are negatively correlated, where correlation goes to zero as
n→∞ (or m→∞ since m≤ n). We conclude our proof by observing that by
Theorem 1 of Baryshnikov and Vitale (1994), the above matrix A can be
swapped with a random rotation matrix R, and the point set X consists of draws
of columns of P=CX.
Our next result states that in the limit, there is a unique political equilibrium
at the mean voter for 50%-majority rule as the number of voters goes to infinity
for voter preference profiles each of which has most preferred positions forming
a regular simplex (i.e. P is the set of all m  1-dimensional regular simplices).
THEOREM 2. (Mean Voter Theorem) Fix d. Take m→∞, then almost surely O,
the mean voter, is the political equilibrium for the 50%-majority rule.
Proof. Let f : Rd →R+ be the underlying limiting marginal probability den-
sity function (pdf) for the columns of limm→∞ X. Let Eρ wð ) denote the
expected value of the score of any point w∈Rn.
First, we show that O ∈Rnð ), the mean voter, is a political equilibrium for the
50%-majority rule. Negatively correlated sampling of political positions has a
smaller min–max rate than independent sampling of political positions from the
same symmetric marginal distribution. Let Y be a set of points independently
sampled from pdf f . Under independent sampling, by Theorem 3 of Caplin and
Nalebuff (1988) the min–max rate of O for Y converges almost surely to the
min–max rate of f at O∈Rd when m→∞. The min–max rate of O for f is 0.5,
since f is symmetric around O ∈Rd ) by Theorem 1. Since the min–max rate
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cannot be smaller than 0.5, min–max rate of O for X also almost surely con-
verges to 0.5, that is, limm→∞ Eρ Oð Þ= 0:5; implying O ∈Rnð ), the mean voter,
is an equilibrium point for the 50:
Next, we prove that O ∈Rnð ) is the unique equilibrium issue. Take any issue
vector w∈Rn\ Of g when m and n→∞. For finite n, let the first n entries of w
be relevant. We will show that limm→∞ Eρ wð Þ >0.5. Let C=PR be the ran-
dom campaign space spanned by the Haar measure, as in the proof of Theorem
1 where R is the n× n impartial random rotation matrix distributed with Haar
measure on Rðn) and P is the d× n matrix with πii= 1 for i≤ d and all other
entries of P are zero. The random projection of the issue vector w on the cam-
paign space is PRw. Note that PRw=O∈Rd with probability 0 and
PRw6¼O∈Rd with probability 1, since w 6¼O∈Rn. Hence, the only relevant
draws of R for the calculation of Eρ wð ) are all R∈Rðn) such that
PRw 6¼O∈Rd. Fix a rotation matrix R∈Rðn) such that PRw 6¼O. Since f is
symmetric around O∈Rd by Theorem 1, the min–max rate of the point PRw
for f is greater than 0.5. Hence, expected min–max rate of the projection PRw
is greater than 0.5 when m→∞, implying limm→∞ Eρ wð Þ > 0:5 and conclud-
ing that w cannot be stable under the 50%-majority voting rule.
5. Conclusion
The present paper proposes a theorem of aggregation of individual preferences
through the 50%-majority rule in a multidimensional spatial voting model. Of
course, the result is obtained at a non-negligible cost in terms of assumptions:
first, the regularity of the simplicial distribution of voters’ ideal points; second,
the ‘uniform distribution’ on the set of linkages between issues imputed by
ideologies (the Haar probability measure on Gðn, dÞ). Of course, the robustness
of the results when one relaxes these two assumptions should be studied. On the
other hand, it is quite strong since it gives existence for the 50%-majority rule.
Another important aspect is that it fingers the mean voter as the candidate most
likely to be stable in the voting process. As underlined in Cre`s and Tvede
(2005), mean voter theorems are very welcome in public economics because in
many contexts the mean voter is the one who has the right incentives as far as
making an economically efficient choice is concerned.
We would like to stress one last point. An important property of the approach
chosen here is that it is compatible with the idea that politicians ‘die in their
ideological boots’. Poole (2003) shows a variety of evidence that members of
the US Congress are ideologically consistent: they adopt an ideological position
and maintain it over time. An interpretation of Theorem 2 is that in the long
run, ignoring the historical, sociological and mediatic shocks which are going to
shape the linkages between political issues, it might be a good strategy not to
change one’s mind. A strategic politician should choose an ideological position
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that he/she believes will place, as frequently as possible over the years, his/her
imputed platform at the center of gravity of the voters’ ideal points. Different
ideological positions come from different tastes, but also from different priors
on the distribution of historical shocks (the so-called ‘sens de l’histoire’) and
therefore of linkages between issues. Maintaining that ideological position over
time is essential for their credibility, and thus an important asset for future poli-
tical successes. Now, what is a good strategy in the short term? A strategy here
is neither the choice of an ideological position (basically chosen once for all at
the beginning of one’s career, although there might be more than one beginning)
nor the choice of a political platform (automatically imputed by the ideological
position), but an action that has an impact on the linkages between issues in a
way that places the candidate at the center of gravity of the projected set of
voters’ ideal points. This is left for future work.
REFERENCES
Balasko, Y. and H. Cre`s (1997) ‘Condorcet Cycles and Super-majority Rules’, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 70: 437–70.
Banks, J. (1995) ‘Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model’, Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics 15: 179–98.
Baryshnikov, Y. M. and R. A. Vitale (1994) ‘Regular Simplices and Gaussian Samples’, Discrete
Computational Geometry 7: 219–26.
Cahoon, L., M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook (1976) ‘A Multidimensional Statistical Procedure for
Spatial Analysis’, manuscript, Carnegie Mellon University.
Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff (1988) ‘On the 64%-majority Rule’, Econometrica 56(4): 787–814.
Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff (1991) ‘Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem’,
Econometrica 59(1): 1–23.
Converse, P. (1964) ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, in D. Apter (ed.) Ideology
and Discontent pp?. New York: Free Press.
Cre`s, H. and M. Tvede (2006) Portfolio diversification and internalization of production external-
ities through majority voting. Cahier de Recherche HEC 816, HEC Paris.
Cre´s, H. and M. Tvede (2009) ‘Production in Incomplete Markets: Expectations Matter for Politi-
cal Stability’, Journal of Mathematical Economics 45: 212–22.
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Enelow, J. and M. Hinich (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Ferejohn, J. A. and D. M. Grether (1974) ‘On a Class of Rational Decision Procedures’, Journal
of Economic Theory 8: 471–82.
Greenberg, J. (1979) ‘Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives’, Econome-
trica 47: 627–36.
Hinich, M. and M. Munger (1997) Analytical Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hinich, M. and W. Pollard (1981) ‘A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competi-
tion’, American Journal of Political Science 25: 323–41.
McCarty, N., K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1997) Income Redistribution and the Realignment of
American Politics. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
McKelvey, R. and N. Schofield (1986) ‘Structural Instability of the Core’, Journal of Mathemati-
cal Economics 15: 179–98.
CRE`S AND U¨NVER: MULTIDIMENSIONAL SPATIAL VOTING MODELS 443
Meirowitz, A. (2004) ‘The Core of Social Choice Problems with Monotonic Preferences and Fea-
sibility Constraints’, Social Choice and Welfare 22: 467–478.
Ordeshook, P. (1976) ‘The Spatial Theory of Elections: A Review and a Critique’, in I. Budge,
I. Crewe and D. Farlie (eds) Party Identification and Beyond. New York: Wiley.
Plott, C. (1967) ‘A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under the Majority Rule’, American
Economic Review 57: 787–806.
Poole, K. (2005) Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Poole, K. (2007) ‘Changing Minds? Not in Congress!’, Public Choice 131: 435–51.
Poole, K. and H. Rosenthal (1991) ‘Patterns of Congressional Voting’, American Journal of Poli-
tical Science 35: 228–78.
Poole, K. and H. Rosenthal (1997) Congress: A Political-economic History of Roll-call Voting.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Popkin, S. (1994) The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Cam-
paigns (2nd edn). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Rosenthal, H. and E. Voeten (2004) ‘Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting: France
1946–1958’, American Journal of Political Science 48: 620–32.
Saari, D. (1997) ‘The Generic Existence of a Core for q-rules’, Economic Theory 9: 219–60.
HERVE´ CRE`S is a professor of economics at Sciences Po, Paris. He has pre-
viously been a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and at HEC, Paris; he
has taught regularly at the University of Copenhagen, at the University of Geneva,
and at Koc¸ University in Istanbul. His main research interests are in general equi-
librium theory, social choice theory and formal political theory, with a particular
emphasis on the study of the role of collective decision mechanisms to fix market
failures. ADDRESS: Sciences Po, 27 rue Saint Guillaume, 75007 Paris, France.
[e-mail: herve.cres@sciences-po.fr]
M. UTKU U¨NVER is a professor of economics at Boston College. He has pre-
viously been a professor at the University of Pittsburgh and at Koc¸ University in
Istanbul. His main research interests are in mechanism design theory to design
and study collective decision mechanisms with special emphasis on correcting
market failures in matching markets in which money cannot be used to implement
the price mechanism. ADDRESS: Boston College, Department of Economics,
140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA 02468, USA. [e-mail:
utku.unver@bc.edu]
444 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 22(4)
